# Lessons from Claude system-prompt leaks and ChatGPT override attempts

> An English edition about prompt exposure, instruction hierarchy, and the limits of prompt-only security.

- Author: Elzo Brito
- Language: en
- Published: 2025-05-11
- Canonical URL: https://elzobrito.com/en/blog/lessons-from-claude-system-prompt-leak-and-chatgpt-overrides/
- Translation: https://elzobrito.com/blog/licoes-da-system-prompt-leak-do-claude-e-as-tentativas-de-override-no-chatgpt/

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This is a curated English edition of a legacy Portuguese article originally published on 2025-05-11. It preserves the public argument and editorial intent while avoiding private details, operational state, or unsupported new claims.

## Core idea

The original article uses public prompt-leak episodes to discuss how model instructions can be exposed, contested, or misunderstood by users.

Its lasting point is architectural: prompts are not a security boundary by themselves. Sensitive behavior needs layered controls, narrow permissions, reviewable logs, and fail-closed design.

## Editorial note

This translation was prepared during the governed migration of the legacy blog into the GitHub Pages hub. Technical references may age; when the topic involves law, public policy, infrastructure, or model behavior, treat the article as educational context and verify current sources before acting.

Portuguese source article: [/blog/licoes-da-system-prompt-leak-do-claude-e-as-tentativas-de-override-no-chatgpt/](/blog/licoes-da-system-prompt-leak-do-claude-e-as-tentativas-de-override-no-chatgpt/).